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Abstract
Adversarial examples are perturbed inputs which
can cause a serious threat for machine learning
models. Finding these perturbations is such a hard
task that we can only use the iterative methods
to traverse. For computational efficiency, recent
works use adversarial generative networks to model
the distribution of both the universal or image-
dependent perturbations directly. However, these
methods generate perturbations only rely on in-
put images. In this work, we propose a more
general-purpose framework which infers target-
conditioned perturbations dependent on both in-
put image and target label. Different from pre-
vious single-target attack models, our model can
conduct target-conditioned attacks by learning the
relations of attack target and the semantics in im-
age. Using extensive experiments on the datasets
of MNIST and CIFAR10, we show that our method
achieves superior performance with single target
attack models and obtains high fooling rates with
small perturbation norms.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been extensively stud-
ied and seen in most daily applications. However, recent
works have demonstrated that DNNs are vulnerable to ad-
versarial perturbations on various tasks, e.g., image recogni-
tion [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014b], object
detection [Thys et al., 2019] or semantic segmentation [Pour-
saeed et al., 2018]. These carefully crafted perturbations are
imperceptible to humans but can mislead a well trained model
after adding to the original inputs.
Many attack algorithms have been proposed for generat-
ing such adversarial perturbations. Among them, model-
based methods use feed-forward networks to generate ad-
versarial perturbations. Prior to optimization-based methods,
they need not to iteratively search the optimal perturbations
in the pixel space, and improves the attack efficiency greatly.
Additionally, model-based methods can produce adversarial
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examples without requiring access to the victim network once
the attacker network is trained.
However, model-based methods are not practical enough
currently for two reasons: 1) model training is a time-
consuming process, and particularly, we need to retrain the
model when the type of the attack (targeted or nontargeted)
or the attack targets are changed. 2) adversarial examples
generated by model-based methods have a poor transferabil-
ity.
In this work, we aim at the first drawback mentioned
above and propose an improved framework to generate target-
conditioned perturbations. Our method is motivated by [Mao
et al., 2019], which uses conditional generative adversar-
ial networks (cGAN) to generate the output conditioned on
both given image and text. We think a good attacker should
learn the relations of attack target and the semantics in im-
age. Thus, it can generate not just the target-specific per-
turbations dependent on input images, but the image-specific
perturbations conditioned on attack targets. For the latter, we
named target-conditioned perturbations. Different from pre-
vious methods which train one model for single target attack,
our approach can generate all types of targeted perturbations
using only one trained model. Furthermore, by treating the
nontarget attack as a peculiar target attack, we use trained
model for nontarget attack as well. Although the model deals
with more attack tasks, the comparative experiment shows
it achieves high fooling rates and superior performance with
single target attack models.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We present an improved model-based attack method
which can generate target-conditioned perturbations un-
der L0, L2 and L∞ norm. It greatly reduces the training
cost and facilitates the attack process.
• Our method can employ a trained targeted attack model
for nontarget attack. It also achieves comparatively high
fooling rates.
• The extensive experiments on MNIST and CIFAR10 il-
lustrate that our method gains superior performance with
single target attack models.
2 Related Work
We introduce the recent work on adversarial examples and
model-based attack in this section.
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Adversarial Examples Various techniques for crafting
adversarial examples have been proposed recently. Tradi-
tional methods of adversarial attack can be divided into two
classes: gradient-based approaches and optimization-based
approaches. In gradient-based approaches such as the clas-
sic Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [Goodfellow et al.,
2014b] and their targeted variants [Kurakin et al., 2016b],
adversarial examples are generated by superimposing small
perturbations along the gradient direction (with respect to the
input image). FGSM uses the linear approximation of the
gradient in deep networks whereas such models are com-
monly thought to be highly non-linear. It leads to sub-
optimal results. To settle this problem, [Kurakin et al., 2016a;
Madry et al., 2017] iteratively take multiple small steps while
adjusting the gradient direction after each step and get better
results. In optimization based approaches, adversarial pertur-
bation is optimized for targeted attacks while satisfying cer-
tain constraints [Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Liu et al., 2016].
However, the optimization process is slow and can only opti-
mize perturbation for one specific instance each time. There-
fore, more and more works use feed-forward network to ap-
proximate optimal perturbations.
Model-based attack methods Model-based attack meth-
ods use image generation [Goodfellow et al., 2014a] or
image-to-image translation [Isola et al., 2017] techniques to
create adversarial examples. This idea is first proposed by
[Baluja and Fischer, 2017]. The created adversarial examples
can be universal [Hayes and Danezis, 2018; Poursaeed et al.,
2018] or image-dependent [Xiao et al., 2018]. Model-based
attack methods ensure the imperceptibility of perturbations in
different ways. [Baluja and Fischer, 2017] and [Xiao et al.,
2018] minimize the L2 distance between the original input
and adversarial examples. [Li et al., 2019; Poursaeed et al.,
2018] embed normalization module in network to constrain
the output directly. Another branch of the methods does not
guarantee the imperceptibility of perturbations. They create
adversarial examples closed in latent space instead of pixel
space [Zhao et al., 2017], or train a class-conditional GAN to
generate adversarial examples in the same class [Tsai, 2018;
Song et al., 2018]. Thus, more unrestricted adversarial exam-
ples can be constructed in this case.
3 Proposed method
SupposeX ⊆ Rn be the pixel space, Y = {1, 2, ..., C} be the
label space. Given original input x ∈ X , a classifier f(x) :
x ∈ X → y ∈ Y and a target label y∗ ∈ {Y {f(x)}, the prob-
lem of generating targeted adversarial examples can be ex-
pressed as the optimization: argminx∗L(x, x
∗) s.t. f(x∗) =
y∗, where L(·) is a distance metric between examples from
the input space (e.g., the L2 norm). Similarly, untargeted at-
tack can also be defined as argminx∗L(x, x
∗) s.t. f(x∗) ∈
{Y {f(x)}. We will go through the proposed scheme of both
targeted and untargeted attacks in the rest of this section.
3.1 Targeted attacks
we firstly overview the general workflow of model-based ad-
versarial attacks. The overall idea of model-based attacks is
to train a neural network g that transforms an input x into an
adversarial example x∗, which fools the classifier f to out-
put target label y∗. Formally, suppose that the neural network
parameterized by θ is gθ, we have the following objective:
Ltargeted =
∑
x∈X
H(f(gθ(x)), y∗) + L(x, gθ(x)) (1)
whereH is the cross-entropy loss.
There are many improvements based on this framework.
For example, GAP [Poursaeed et al., 2018] trains gθ to ap-
proximate the difference of input and adversarial images
for better controlling over the perturbation magnitude. In
other words, it generates adversarial examples x∗ by adding
∆x = gθ(x) to input x. In equation 1, L(·) term makes the
perturbation imperceptible. More advanced metrics such as
soft hinge loss [Xiao et al., 2018], perceptual similarity loss
[Reddy Mopuri et al., 2018] had been proposed. But opti-
mizing L(·) cannot guarantee that the model outputs adver-
sarial examples which conform to the norm condition in the
test phase. Therefore, another improvement is to normalize
on the model output instead of adding an objective term in
the training stage. Our work adopts these modification in the
framework for getting preferable results.
Figure 1 illustrates the overall architecture of the proposed
model, which mainly consists of two parts: an attacker net-
work g and a victim network f . The attacker network takes
the target label y∗ and original instance x as its input. To add
y∗ as conditional information, the attacker network can pro-
duce a distribution of perturbations, i.e. P (∆x|x, y∗), which
is conditioned on target labels. Then the output of the attacker
is scaled to constrain its fixed norm. Specifically, if we have
∆x, the normalized perturbations can be obtained by multi-
plying ∆x with min
(
1, ‖∆x‖p
)
, where  is the maximum
permissible Lp norm. Three types of normalization term are
used in our model. L∞ and L2 have been proposed in [Pour-
saeed et al., 2018]. Besides, we put forward the new L0 norm
for model-based attack. In our method, L0 norm is imple-
mented by simply selecting top-k pixel values in ∆x, where
k is given by users, similar to . Next we add the normal-
ized perturbations ∆xnorm and original input x together, i.e.
x∗ = ∆xnorm + x. In last stage, x∗ is clipped for ensuring it
in the valid range of images and final result is the generated
adversarial example.
Overall, the objective function of targeted attack is:
Ltargeted =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∗∈{Y{f(x)}
H(f(gθ(x, y∗)), y∗) (2)
normalizing and clipping operations are omitted here for sim-
plicity.
3.2 Untargeted attacks
In this section, we show how to employ our method to con-
duct untargeted attacks. Traditional methods using fooling
loss to optimize attack algorithms. Fooling loss aims to max-
imize the cross-entropy between fooled prediction and origi-
nal prediction:
Luntargeted = −
∑
x∈X
H(f(gθ(x)), f(x)) (3)
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Figure 1: The overall architecture of our proposed method. Left part is the attacker network, and right part is the victim network (Best viewed
in color). The parameters of victim network remain fixed during the training procedure.
This maximize objective is incompatible with Ltargeted,
which has a minimize objective. They cannot be optimized
together. Alternatively, as proposed in [Kurakin et al., 2016b]
and [Kurakin et al., 2016a], we consider least-likely class
fll(x) = arg min f(x) as the target to train the model. In
our architecture, every input image needs corresponding tar-
get label as condition information. However, no conditional
target label exists in untargeted case. For this problem, as
shown in Figure 1, we simply use zero vector for untargeted
training. Because it does not affect the learning of internal
representations by concatenating zero tensors in the model.
The untargeted loss can be formulated as:
Luntargeted =
∑
x∈X
H(f(gθ(x),~0), fll(x)) (4)
By viewing least-likely untargeted attack as a special targeted
attack. We adopt Luntargeted as the one training objective in
the model. Now, we have the overall training objective as
follows:
L = Ltargeted + αLuntargeted (5)
where α is a balance coefficient. We set α to 1 as default in
the rest of the paper.
Conventional model-based method needs to train models
for attacks of different types or different targets. It leads to
a great cost of time and computing resources. However, by
using our approach, we can generate all types of adversar-
ial examples just by training one model. In this aspect, our
method is a lighter version which can be used for many at-
tack tasks. Additionally, although the model deals with more
attack tasks, our experiment shows it still has good attack per-
formance.
4 Experiments
In this section, we first evaluate our model for both targeted
and non-targeted white-box attack settings on the benchmarks
of MNIST and CIFAR10. For each dataset, we simply use the
training set to train the generative model and the validation set
for evaluation.
We will provide details of the network architecture and the
training procedure. The generation of pertubations has many
shared properties with the image translation task, so our gen-
erative model mainly follows the architecture design of [Mao
et al., 2019]. Target labels as the conditioning infromation,
are concatenated with the output of residual blocks before
the deconvolution layers. The training time is partly deter-
mined by the class number of the recognition task. It takes
half an hour to converge that training attack models on MN-
SIT and CIFAR10 task. The algorithm is runing on two Tesla
P100 GPUs and optimized by Adam with the learning rate of
0.0002.
4.1 Experiment on MNIST and CIFAR10
We first train three networks on the standard MNIST and
CIFAR10 classification tasks. For MNSIT, we use 3-fully-
connected-layer MLP network, ResNet18 and LeNet as the
basic classifier. For more complicated CIFAR10 object
recognition, three stronger model: SENet18, ResNet18 and
VGG11 are used instead. Both the MNIST and CIFAR10
images are rescaled to 32×32 size with 3 RGB channels for
fitting the input size of the basic networks. To restrict the gen-
erated adversarial examples, we normalize the network output
on different metrics. L0, L2 and Linf are used in the experi-
ment (detailed analysis of different norm type can be seen in
last paragraph of this section).
We compare the performance of our algorithm with FGSM
and GAP. FGSM is the most representative gradient-based
method which query the victim model at once and get the gra-
dient of the loss function with respect to pixels, and moves a
single step based on the sign of the gradient. GAP is a model-
based method which use generative model to produce uni-
versal or image-dependent pertubations. Both of compared
methods are fast and efficient. In order to ensure the fairness,
we do not contrast with iterative optimized methods, such as
Carlini and Wagner’s methods (CW). They attack slowly by
querying many times to the target model, which are not prac-
tical in real-world scenario.
Performance of non-target attack. We show the success
rate of non-target attack in Table 1. All the methods are evalu-
Datasets Attacktype Models AV%
AA%
=0.05
AA%
=0.1
AA%
=0.15
AA%
=0.2
MNIST
FGSM
MLP 97.5% 82.6% 55.4% 39.9% 29.3%
ResNet18 99.4% 85.7% 62.1% 43.9% 30.0%
LeNet 99.2% 94.3% 85.1% 68.3% 43.1%
GAP
MLP 97.5% 72.4% 44.7% 36.9% 28.0%
ResNet18 99.4% 76.8% 58.3% 40.5% 30.7%
LeNet 99.2% 85.2% 68.2% 57.5% 46.1%
GAP++
MLP 97.5% 73.8% 43.3% 38.7% 27.0%
ResNet18 99.4% 75.1% 56.9% 36.4% 28.8%
LeNet 99.2% 82.7% 68.5 % 55.4% 40.8%
CIFAR10
FGSM
SENet18 90.5% 88.3% 80.0% 78.9% 72.2%
ResNet18 92.9% 87.2% 83.6% 80.3% 73.1%
VGG11 89.3% 87.8% 83.6% 82.1% 73.5%
GAP
SENet18 90.5% 41.4% 23.4% 10.9% 2.2%
ResNet18 92.9% 47.5% 20.1% 5.4% 0.0%
VGG11 89.3% 47.2% 21.1% 7.8% 3.9%
GAP++
SENet18 90.5% 33.7% 18.0% 6.2% 0.0%
ResNet18 92.9% 44.3% 18.0% 8.5% 0.0%
VGG11 89.3% 41.9% 21.3% 9.2% 3.7%
Table 1: Comparison of the non-targeted attack performance. We
show the AV% metric (Accuracy on the Validation set) and AA%
metric (Accuracy on the Adversary set) on three different attack
methods: FGSM, GAP and GAP++.
ated on the test partition using L∞ norm. As shown in the ta-
ble, FGSM has lower attack success rate with others. The rea-
son is that FGSM only uses a single direction based on the lin-
ear approximation of the gradient, which leads to sub-optimal
results. As a more powerful generative model, GAP get state-
of-the-art attack success rate on both MNIST and CIFAR10
datasets. GAP only uses least-likely prediction as the desired
class to produce the non-target adversarial samples. How-
ever, our approach fuses non-target and target attack tasks in
one model. Surprisingly, although GAP++ deals with more
tasks, the Table 1 shows GAP++ has no performance loss but
promotes the effect of non-target attacks slightly. We analyze
that the non-target attack can benefit from other tasks such
as targeted attack in our model. The result suggests GAP++
surpass GAP 2%-3% on fooling rate averagely.
Interestingly, we found the choice of the basic classifica-
tion network will affect the success rate of attack in some
cases. Specifically, for MNIST digit classification task, both
MLP and ResNet18 is more vulnerable than LeNet. MLP has
simpler network structure and less parameters, which leads to
under-fitting problem. On the contrary, ResNet18 has more
model capacity and may overfit on MNIST dataset. From
this phenomenon, we analyse that any under-fitting or over-
fitting will reduce robustness and increase vulnerability of the
model.
Performance of target attack. We make a comparative
analysis of our method with FGSM and GAP. Table 2 shows
the experimental results, we use the accuracy of target class
prediction as attack success rate. In the experiment, we
choose 5 classes and calculate the prediction accuracy of each
class. FGSM can generate arbitrary targeted attacks by cal-
culating the gradient that reduces the loss of the target class,
but it is not very accurate. Contrary to FGSM, GAP attacks
target model with higher accuracy but it is unable to gener-
ate arbitrary targeted perturbations. So, for each target, we
train a GAP model respectively (the model is tagged as GAP-
1 if target of the attack is target-1). The result suggests each
Attack
type
AA%
=0.2 Target-1 Target-2 Target-3 Target-4 Target-5
FGSM 93.4% 11.4% 10.8% 11.1% 11.0% 11.4%
GAP-1 75.9% 12.5% 2.1% 1.2% 1.7% 0.9%
GAP-2 75.3% 1.9% 12.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
GAP-3 76.3% 1.2% 1.7% 12.1% 1.7% 1.8%
GAP-4 76.2% 1.0% 1.8% 1.6% 12.2% 2.0%
GAP-5 77.7% 1.3% 1.1% 2.0% 2.3% 11.5%
GAP++ 50.5% 13.3% 12.8% 12.8% 12.0% 11.6%
Table 2: Comparison of the targeted attack performance. We pick
5 different target labels to conduct the targeted attack on MNIST
dataset using =0.2 as the L∞ norm. GAP cannot generate var-
ious targeted perturbations, so we train the model for each target
respectively. AA% is calculated by averaging the accuracy on total
5 targeted adversaries.
GAP model only focuses only on generating single target at-
tacks. It signifies we must train 5 models to generate 5 types
of target attacks. The proposed GAP++ overcomes this dis-
advantages of traditional model-based attack. By modeling
the distribution of multi-targeted perturbations, we deal with
all types of target attacks using one GAP++ model. Addition-
ally, from the table 2 we found even GAP++ generates more
various perturbations, it gains superior performance with sin-
gle targeted attack models. In terms of fooling rate, GAP++
achieves higher attack success rate than GAP because it mod-
ifies more samples to cheat the model.
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Figure 2: The line chart compares the performance of GAP++ using
different norm term: L∞, L2 and L0. We set the experiment under
the targeted attack on ResNet18 model trained by MNIST and CI-
FAR10. The solid line indicates the model accuracy on generated
adversarial samples, and the dotted line presents the targeted attack
success rate.
Norm constraint analysis. We analyze three normaliza-
tion term named L∞, L2 and L0 in GAP++. L∞ is a norm
term which limits the maximum change of single pixel in ad-
versarial samples. While L2 constrains the sum of total pixel
variations. L0 introduces the sparsity to variations and aims
to cheat the model by altering as few pixels as possible. We
establish relation among these three norm terms by defining
total variation metric, which represents the maximum varia-
tion of all pixels in the image for each norm term. As shown
in Figure 2, L∞ achieves the best effect on both MNIST and
CIFAR10 dataset, whileL2 andL0 suffer a great performance
loss. The result indicates L2 and L0 are still hard to applied
on model-based adversarial attacks. By using L∞ norm, we
found it is easy for model to learn the pattern or structure
of perturbations instead of predicting the perturbation values
directly. Although L2 and L0 normalize the output as well,
however, the model tries hard to pick the right perturbation
values from a wide range (0-128). Therefore, GAP++ trained
on L2 and L0 norm can be more prone to fall into local op-
timum and output the sub-optimal results. We visualize the
reconstructed adversary and its corresponding perturbations
in Figure 3. L∞ and L2 norm makes the model to generate
smooth perturbations. L0 norm lets the model output salt-
and-pepper perturbations, which can be clearly distinguished.
From the perspective of perception, we can draw a conclusion
that L∞ is a preferable normalization method.
𝐿 "= 2
0
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Figure 3: Visualization of targeted adversarial examples when total
variation is 160 (correspondingL∞ = 20, L2 = 25 andL0 = 160).
For each image grid, rows represent different targets and columns
represent different original inputs.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel model-based adversarial at-
tack method named GAP++, which can be used to generate
target-conditioned perturbations. GAP++ borrows the net-
work architecture and normalization trick from original GAP,
but achieves superior performance and lighter than GAP. Us-
ing extensive experiments on the datasets of MNIST and CI-
FAR10, we show that our method achieves high fooling rates
with small perturbation norms. However, Our approach still
behaves weakly in transferability, which is a problem to be
solved in the future work.
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